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ABSTRACT
Who rules during the civil war? This article argues that the concept of armed group 
governance must be expanded to include auxiliary armed forces linked to rebels or 
the government. Comparing the organization of rebel and government auxiliaries, 
the article demonstrates that security governance during war is never static, but 
evolves over time. Evidence from the civil war in Mozambique (1976–1992) shows 
that the auxiliary’s origin shapes its initial level of autonomy. Second, auxiliary 
contribution to battlefield success of one side may induce innovations adopted 
by auxiliaries on the other. Both have distinct consequences for the nature of 
governance.
Introduction
Who rules during civil war? Given the limits of many states to address security 
threats and other governance challenges under wartime conditions, alternative, 
localised arrangements often emerge through which those in power coordinate 
the implementation of policies with other actors, delegate tasks to them or 
merely tolerate their involvement in service provision and conflict resolution 
(Arjona 2014, Staniland 2012, 2017). This multi-actor, multi-layered nature of 
wartime governance1 empowers non-state actors and nurtures opportunistic 
political and economic interests, which may pose significant challenges to state- 
and peacebuilding (Seymour 2014).
A good illustration of this dynamic is the case of Somalia. In response to the 
absence of a central government, ‘informal systems of adaptation, security, and 
governance’ emerged in local communities that tried to ‘adapt in a variety of 
ways to minimise risk and increase predictability in their dangerous environ-
ments’ (Menkhaus 2007, pp. 74, 75). Business leaders, civil society organisations, 
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and other (armed) actors develop an interest in prolonged warfare, lawlessness, 
or state failure and, as a consequence, act as potential ‘spoilers’ in the peace 
process. The way in which those in power nurture, respond to, coordinate or 
undermine such alternative governance systems is crucial to understanding 
successes and failures in state- and peacebuilding.
Struggle in the domain of security governance is the focus of this article. By 
security governance, I mean arrangements between and amongst state and non-
state (armed) groups to maintain territorial control. Such arrangements entail a 
‘fragmentation of power and authority’ in the security realm (Krahmann 2003, p. 
20) and devolution of responsibilities within a network of actors (Abrahamsen 
and Williams 2008, p. 545).
Research on fragile statehood and civil war has explored the fragmentation 
of armed groups (Sinno 2008, Bakke et al. 2012), the emergence of alliances 
between armed actors to influence war outcomes (Christia 2012, Seymour 2014), 
‘wartime institutions’ that govern civilians (Arjona 2014) or ‘armed politics’ that 
shape how states and armed groups interact (Staniland 2017). I build on this 
research to analyse change in alliances and their implication for security gov-
ernance. The fragmentation of authority in the security realm is often shaped by 
what state and non-state actors learn from their opponents on how to secure 
territorial control. However, empowering armed actors to assist with security 
governance may intensify the conflict by inciting more violence (Clayton and 
Thomson 2014), which in turn may militarise security governance further. This 
dynamic is the focus of this article. I show that even though initial conditions 
influence how security governance is organised, they evolve through processes 
of experimentation, innovation, and learning that largely respond to dynamics 
on the battlefield; hence the notion that governance during civil war is domi-
nated by a military logic (Wood 2008).
Auxiliary armed forces play a crucial part in that innovation process. These 
groups consist of civilians with little to no military training and limited access to 
weapons. They are frequently referred to as self-defense forces, vigilantes and 
militias that are either aligned with the government or the rebels, or attempt to 
remain independent. I use the term ‘auxiliary armed forces’ for two reasons. First, 
it is neutral enough to include auxiliaries both on the government and rebel 
side. In contrast, previous work defines ‘militias’ as counter-insurgent armed 
groups who emerge to protect the local population from rebels (Jentzsch 2014). 
Second, the term ‘auxiliary’ emphasises that such forces assist the rebels or the 
government in their efforts to control the local population. The kind of relation-
ship and division of labour that emerges between the principal group and the 
auxiliary influences wartime governance.
In this article, I compare the organisation and evolution of auxiliary armed 
forces on the rebel side with those on the government side in order to demon-
strate that security governance during war is never static, but evolves over time. 
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Using evidence from the civil war in Mozambique (1976–92), I contrast the align-
ment between state armed forces and auxiliaries with that between rebels and 
auxiliary armed forces. Both the Renamo (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique) 
rebels and the Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) government aligned 
with auxiliary armed forces to function as a liaison to the civilian population and 
support the fight against the other. Renamo created the mujeeba in the central 
and northern regions as a separate force from regular combatants. The mujeeba 
lived amongst the population and were responsible for vigilance, collecting food 
from the population for the base and enforcing rebel rule. In 1988–89, Frelimo 
aligned with a grassroots movement in the Centre and North, the Naparama, 
which had emerged independently amongst the displaced. Naparama took 
over policing and military tasks. The Naparama posed such a severe threat to 
Renamo that Renamo elites decided to form a stronger auxiliary armed force (an 
‘enhanced mujeeba’ force) in 1990–91. Its role was more offensive than that of 
the prior mujeeba and focused on defeating the Naparama. With this renewed 
effort, Renamo managed to gain the upper hand again and made significant mil-
itary advances in central and northern Mozambique, shortly before the signing 
of the peace agreement in October 1992 that ended the war. This article traces 
this learning process and points to critical junctures that influenced innovations 
in these multi-actor, multi-layered governance systems and their consequences 
for governance outcomes.
The article proceeds as follows. I first provide a short introduction to political 
order in civil wars, rebel governance and militias. I then analyse Renamo’s rela-
tionship with civilians and the role of auxiliary armed forces in security govern-
ance in rebel-held zones. I discuss how civilians in the government-held zones 
responded to Renamo’s threat, and in turn how Renamo reacted to increased 
pressure from civilian-based militias. The evidence for this paper comes 
from interview and archival data, collected during 14 months of fieldwork in 
Mozambique between 2010 and 2016, and secondary sources.2
Security Governance and Auxiliary Armed Forces in Civil War
Auxiliary armed forces are crucial for both the state and armed groups to create 
links between them and the local population they control. First, civil war does 
not necessarily create disorder, and violence is not the only way rebels interact 
with civilians (Weinstein 2007, Mampilly 2011, Arjona et al. 2015, Arjona 2016, 
Huang 2016, Terpstra and Frerks in this issue). Rebel groups (re-)create norms 
and institutions to optimise their control over the local population and occupied 
territory, gain access to resources and in most cases, especially in secessionist 
wars, govern (Reno 1998, Jackson 2003, Mampilly 2011, Kasfir 2015, Malejacq 
2016). Rebels’ relations with civilians vary with respect to the degree to which 
civilians are involved in the administrative and decision-making processes, how 
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responsive armed groups are to civilian preferences, and to what degree armed 
groups regulate civilian life (Kasfir 2015, Weinstein 2007, Arjona 2016, Terpstra 
and Frerks in this issue). While some armed groups take people’s needs into 
account and provide extensive public services to create their own quasi-state, 
such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka (Mampilly 2011, Terpstra and Frerks in this issue), 
others limit their interactions with civilians and focus on resource extraction, 
such as Renamo in Mozambique (Vines 1991, Weinstein 2007).
In both cases, once rebels occupy territory, they need to engage with the 
local population in order to solidify territorial control (Weinstein 2007, p. 164, 
Kalyvas 2006, p. 107). In Sri Lanka, for example, the LTTE was supported by 
three civilian auxiliary units of several thousand men that were recruited from 
the local peasant population (Richards 2014, p. 29). In South Sudan, the White 
Army, a loose network of self-defense units composed of civilian youths, has 
in recent years provided a liaison for the SPLA-in-Opposition, led at the time 
by Riek Machar (Breidlid and Arensen 2014). Auxiliaries of the FARC and ELN in 
Colombia organised the population in urban areas, with a special focus on the 
political education of the masses (Dieterich 2016, Velasquez 1995). These auxilia-
ries shape rebel interactions with civilians, as they help to solve the ‘identification 
problem’ (Kalyvas 2006, p. 107). In irregular war, rebels (and their supporters) 
tend to hide amongst the population. Local intelligence is necessary to distin-
guish between supporters and defectors and can be provided by auxiliaries 
with close contacts with civilians. Despite their crucial function in the internal 
organisation of rebel groups and systems of rebel governance, rebels’ auxiliary 
armed forces have so far received little attention in scholarly research. Most 
recent work on armed group fragmentation focuses on competition between 
different armed groups or units on the rebel side (Bakke et al. 2012, Christia 
2012, Sinno 2008). In contrast, this article analyses how different units within 
the same organisation complement each other.
Research on auxiliaries on the government side has increased over the last 
few years, with significant advances in identifying the causes and consequences 
of their formation and collaboration with state security forces (see e.g., Carey 
et al. 2013, Schubiger 2013, Mitchell et al. 2014, Clayton and Thomson 2014, Peic 
2014, Jentzsch 2014, Jentzsch et al. 2015, Biberman 2016). Within the broader 
framework of ‘armed politics’ (Staniland 2017), state auxiliaries are those armed 
groups with which states align themselves. States can either mobilise such forces 
themselves (top-down mobilisation) or co-opt existing forces (bottom-up mobi-
lisation) (Jentzsch et al. 2015). In Sierra Leone, for example, the Kamajor formed 
as local defense forces, which were later co-opted by political elites and became 
a professional armed force that even substituted for the state army (Hoffman 
2011). Governments frequently delegate tasks to such forces to increase access 
to intelligence, multiply manpower, and/or avoid accountability (Carey et al. 
2013, Mitchell et al. 2014). In Sudan’s Darfur region, the government outsourced 
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violence against the rebellion to local Janjaweed militias to avoid being held 
accountable (De Waal 2004).
Auxiliary armed forces can have defensive, offensive or purely logistic pur-
poses. Their primary purpose is to provide assistance in population control, infor-
mation gathering, resource extraction and logistics to their respective ‘senior’ 
partner. I argue that two factors – a structural and a dynamic one – influence the 
division of labour between auxiliary and senior partner in particular, and secu-
rity governance more broadly. First is the origin of the auxiliary. If the auxiliary 
emerges independently of the senior partner, and cooperation between the 
two is ad hoc, auxiliaries tend to have more autonomy and take on a variety of 
tasks. If the senior partner is involved in the formation of the auxiliary, respon-
sibilities tend to be limited and clearly defined, as they fulfil concrete tasks in a 
well-organised system of governance.
Second, given the military context in which governance emerges, successes 
and failures on the battlefield may lead to ‘tactical innovation’ and ‘tactical adap-
tation’, which may initiate auxiliary armed group formation and co-optation in 
the first place, or increase the auxiliaries’ autonomy, and change and expand 
their activities as a consequence.3 This process is similar to what scholars in 
policy research have labelled ‘learning’, the updating of previously held beliefs 
to make policies more effective (Dobbin et al. 2007). Armed groups can learn 
from a rival’s tactics and adopt them to improve their own system of security 
governance. This dynamic has implications for governance outcomes for non-
combatants, as protection and the enforcement of rules may become more 
militarised and violent if armed groups are more involved in the governance 
of civilians (Wood 2008).
I develop and explore these arguments with evidence from the civil war in 
Mozambique (1976–92). The advantage of this case is that the conflict had two 
main parties – the incumbent versus the insurgent. Over the course of the war, 
both sides developed similar tactics and came to resemble each other in peo-
ple’s post-war narratives (Bertelsen 2016, pp. 73, 74, 83). Crucially, both on the 
rebel and the government side, auxiliary armed forces supported governance 
efforts. I focus on the war in the central and northern provinces of Nampula 
and Zambézia where Renamo was more involved in governance and its vio-
lence tended to be less atrocious than in the South, where Frelimo aligned with 
grassroots auxiliaries, and where the interaction between the auxiliaries of the 
two sides can be well observed.4 I specifically focus on the effect of auxiliaries 
on governance outcomes; violence perpetrated by Renamo and Frelimo com-
batants lie outside the scope of this article.5
330   C. JENTZSCH
Security Governance in Mozambique’s Civil War
Auxiliary Armed Forces in Rebel-held Areas
Renamo was formed with the help of the Rhodesian intelligence service in the 
late 1970s (Vines 1991). Armed activity began in the centre of Mozambique, but 
then extended, over the course of the 1980s and with the support of Apartheid 
South Africa, to the south and north of the country. The overall goal of Renamo 
attacks was to reverse Frelimo’s socialist policies after independence by destroy-
ing state infrastructure and communal villages – a prime symbol of Frelimo’s 
socialist vision of society, economy and government (Vines 1991, Coelho 1998). 
When the rebels began to occupy rural areas, they reversed Frelimo’s secularist 
policies, as this respondent outlined: ‘They told us: if there’re Christians [among 
you], then worship, if there are chiefs [among you], then pray to the spirits […] 
and conduct [your] ceremonies’.6
Despite these political goals, Renamo made limited attempts to mobilise 
the people and recruit volunteers, though there was some variation in political 
indoctrination across provinces (Schafer 2007, p. 66). Discontent with Frelimo 
by marginalised traditional leaders and the rural peasantry and local conflicts 
increased support for Renamo (Geffray 1990, Lubkemann 2005, Roesch 1989).7 
However, Renamo’s main strategy of recruitment was the abduction of young 
men, including many children (Hanlon 1984, p. 229, Schafer 2007, pp. 58, 68, 
Bertelsen 2016, p. 30).8 Promises of economic and political benefits, threats 
of punishment and a process of ‘resocialization’ convinced the abducted to 
stay with the rebels (Vines 1991, p. 95, Schafer 2007). Traditional leaders often 
decided to side with Renamo for the same reasons (Roesch 1992, Geffray 1990, 
Pereira 1999b).
The rebels’ limited political structure and efforts of mobilisation led ana-
lysts to conclude that ‘Renamo was first and foremost a military organization’ 
(Finnegan 1992, p. 74). The nature of the group’s organisation supported this 
claim. While Renamo’s political organisation was relatively weak, its military 
organisation was strong. The organisation had a centralised military hierarchy, 
which was supported by South Africa’s supply of a sophisticated radio network 
(Vines 1991, p. 82).9 Afonso Dhlakama was the commander-in-chief, assisted by 
a 15-member military council composed of three chiefs-of-staff for the northern, 
centre and southern zones, 10 provincial commanders, and Dhlakama’s personal 
staff. Provinces were subdivided into two to three regional commands. One 
regional command consisted of a brigade, which consisted of several battal-
ions (each about 250 men), companies (100–150 men), platoons (30 men) and 
sections (10 men).10
The construction of Renamo bases reflected the group’s centralised military 
hierarchy. In the central and northern regions, where discontent with Frelimo 
was higher, Renamo was able to establish more permanent bases. Renamo’s 
bases in the South, where support for Frelimo was strong, were more mobile 
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(Roesch 1992). Amongst these bases were ‘regional’ or ‘provincial’ bases, in which 
the commander of that geographical unit resided. Casa Banana in Gorongosa 
district in Sofala province was Renamo’s headquarters until the Zimbabwean 
re-capture of the base in 1986.
The areas in which Renamo established military bases were part of the 
rebels’ ‘control zones’, in contrast to ‘tax zones’ and ‘destruction zones’ (Gersony 
1988). In Kalyvas (2006) framework, these zones correspond to areas under 
full, partial or contested territorial control. Control zones were areas in which 
the population was involved in food production for Renamo and assisted in 
the transport of supplies to the base. ‘Tax zones’ were areas in which Renamo 
combatants collected food contributions from the population and abducted 
people. ‘Destruction zones’ experienced frequent Renamo attacks until they 
were completely destroyed and their residents had fled.
Governance was most common in control zones, though Renamo’s provision 
of services in exchange for supplies remained limited (Gersony 1988). Some 
of the former Renamo combatants I spoke with had been trained as nurses, 
but they appear to have treated combatants only.11 Some refer to schools that 
existed within areas under Renamo control,12 but as one respondent said, ‘they 
were constantly burned down’, presumably by Frelimo forces.13 As Vines (1991, 
p. 93) argues, the only reciprocity that Renamo offered was ‘religious tolerance, 
access to ICRC emergency food aid and the opportunity to remain alive’. Military 
priorities would always override concessions to civilians. This is why Weinstein 
(2007, p. 186) states that Renamo governance was ‘unilateral’ and relied on ‘lim-
ited participation’. He found little evidence that noncombatants were involved in 
political decision-making and demonstrates that governance benefitted mostly 
the armed organisation, and not the civilians living under its control.
The evidence I collected leads me to a similar conclusion, despite the exist-
ence of a system of indirect rule through civilian administrators and traditional 
authorities (Geffray 1990, Pereira 1999b). Below Renamo’s military hierarchy 
existed an administrative hierarchy that included traditional authorities, mam-
bos and their assistants, mujeeba, (also called mujuba, majiba, madjuba or 
madjuhba).14 The empowerment of traditional authorities implied a significant 
recognition of their power to settle community conflicts and regulate daily 
life (Geffray 1990, p. 118). In the words of a mambo in Nampula, they were in 
charge of ‘the health of the family and the community’.15 The mambos’ tasks 
included the redistribution of the population in the area held by Renamo, the 
establishment of advance posts, the maintenance of surveillance and intelli-
gence networks, and the recruitment of local auxiliaries, the mujeeba, and, in 
the North, a local police force, which Geffray refers to as capeceiros (Geffray 
1990, p. 119).16 My respondents spoke of civilian administrators (‘delegados’) 
in Renamo strongholds such as Namarrói in Zambézia who were tasked with 
counting and controlling the population, while mambos focused on dispute 
resolution and the collection of food for the base.17
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The involvement of civilians and empowerment of traditional authorities 
represented an attempt to legitimise Renamo rule. At the same time, however, it 
implied a strict separation between civilians and combatants, which was ensured 
through the geographical location of military bases away from the population 
and the rigid regulation of combatants’ interactions with civilians. Military bases 
were situated in deep forests and close to rivers for water supply.18 Control posts 
limited access to the centre of the base where the main commander resided.19 
The civilian population did not have access to the base, but lived in concentric 
circles around it, thus serving as a disguise for the base, a ‘human shield’, and 
informers (Geffray 1990, Vines 1991, p. 91).20 When civilians sought to contact 
combatants, they went to the nearest control post (Geffray 1990, p. 118). Strict 
rules regulated combatants’ interactions with civilians (Schafer 2007, p. 70) 
and combatants’ movements were closely controlled.21
In order to keep close control over the population without being engaged in 
policing themselves, Renamo formed a separate force for that task, the mujeeba 
(‘informers’). Mujeebas were responsible for the collection of information, food 
and taxes from the population.22 Mujeebas were clearly distinguished from reg-
ular combatants. They had limited access to weapons and training and were 
only allowed to carry cutting instruments (in contrast to combatants’ access 
to AK-47s) (Vines 1991, p. 92). Renamo officials did not consider them part of 
the group’s fighting forces and did not completely trust them. While regular 
combatants often fought in areas far away from their homes (Wiegink 2013, p. 
115), mujeebas lived amongst the population in their area of origin. They were 
not allowed to come close to the base as, in case they fled to government-held 
areas, they might take Renamo ‘secrets’ with them (Geffray 1990, pp. 117, 118).23 
Mambos recruited mujeebas, voluntarily or by coercion, from local youth or from 
amongst those captured during raids (Vines 1991, p. 92).24
The mujeeba’s role as Renamo’s local intelligence and enforcement agents 
created an oppressive form of governance. In the first public account of the 
mujeeba in 1985, Renamo Secretary General Fernandes considered their access 
to information and local knowledge as the most crucial characteristics: ‘The 
mujeeba is our representative at the village level. He knows everybody in his 
village. Nobody can come without being known. Then nobody also can betray 
us because he surveys the area’.25 A former Renamo combatant in Nampula 
showed that the mujeebas’ role was that of a vicious secret police and strict 
enforcer of Renamo rule:
The work of the mujeeba among the people was mainly the work of secret police 
agents. Where people would go, to church, [the mujeeba] would be there. In order 
to control the population and those who might be against Renamo. Those [who 
were against Renamo] they arrested and took to the base. And there were also peo-
ple in the neighborhoods that seemed [mentally ill] and spoke badly of Renamo; 
the base sent mujeeba there as well. To arrest them. They were all arrested. And 
when the combatants went to the bush to stage attacks, [the mujeeba] carried 
material and assisted the combatants. They were also sent to collect food from 
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the population to bring to the base. They went to search for chickens, [and often 
took them] by force. And pigs. That’s how it was. And women, and everything. 
To take to the base. So these were assistants to the base. They were the most 
dangerous people.26
The excerpt shows that the primary task of mujeebas was to ensure discipline, 
arrest any infiltrators and prevent people from fleeing.27 In cases in which people 
attempted to escape, mujeebas were tasked to search and kill the defectors 
(Hall 1990, p. 57, Vines 1991, p. 93).28 As the excerpt shows, mujeebas also col-
lected food from peasants to bring to the base (Gersony 1988, p. 24, Vines 1991, 
pp. 92, 93, Pereira 1999a, p. 45). Contrary to what Secretary General Fernandes 
claimed in 1985 in the same interview quoted above, food collection was largely 
a coercive endeavour; some respondents report that those who refused to pro-
vide food to the mujeebas would be killed.29 Mujeebas frequently abused their 
powers and took not only food, but also women by force.30 Respondents who 
lived in government-held areas during the war claimed that it was the mujeebas 
who did the killing, pillaging and raping in the villages, not the regular Renamo 
combatants.31
Mujeebas also went on missions to infiltrate government-held areas to collect 
information about troop movements and planned operations.32 As a conse-
quence, Frelimo used the term ‘mujeeba’ for any displaced people arriving in 
government-held areas, labelling them as potential Renamo collaborators.33 
Accusing the displaced of spying gave Frelimo troops a reason to punish them, 
or at least prevent them from entering Frelimo-held areas to seek refuge (Lemia 
2001, pp. 47, 48). In a war in which it was difficult to identify who belonged to the 
other side, peasants in contested areas were considered potential collaborators, 
‘mujeebas’ (Vines 1991, p. 99).
Overall, Renamo’s delegation of tasks to auxiliary forces represented its strict 
separation of military from social and political affairs, and served its major stra-
tegic and military interest to enforce control over the population and occupied 
territory. Renamo did attempt to legitimate its war in the centre and north by 
appealing to traditional sources of power. Re-instating traditional authorities 
and mobilising traditional spirit mediums to support Renamo combatants were 
two strategies in this regard (Wilson 1992). I agree with Weinstein (2007, p. 182), 
though, when he concludes,
Although the reappointment of régulos [traditional authorities] was an effective 
political appeal, it was also a strategy aimed at centralizing political control in a 
hierarchical structure and limiting both the participation of civilians and their 
capacity to shape the trajectory of the organization.
Furthermore, Renamo appealed to traditional religion in order to develop 
a ‘cult of military prowess’ to further military interests rather than forge a link 
between combatants and the local population (Wilson 1992). Renamo did 
not have a monopoly on ritual sources of power and was soon challenged by 
Frelimo’s auxiliary armed forces that also appealed to traditional religion.
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Governance in rebel-held areas, then, was primarily coercive and unilateral in 
nature and organised to ensure the military success of Renamo. Renamo’s strict 
control over the formation and organisation of the auxiliaries reduced their role 
to population control in a system of security governance that served first and 
foremost the rebel’s military agenda.
Auxiliary Armed Forces in Government-held Zones
Governance was different in Frelimo-held rural areas, where the political and 
military structure became increasingly decentralised and disorganised in light 
of Renamo’s threat. That resulted in the emergence of grassroots movements 
for people’s self-defense, which, when aligning with Frelimo, enjoyed a higher 
level of autonomy by comparison to the mujeeba.
The most important auxiliary armed forces on the government-side,34 the 
Naparama, formed in the late 1980s in the border region between Zambézia 
and Nampula after a large Frelimo counter-offensive failed to stop Renamo 
advances and restore stability. The force reached, between 1988 and 1992, a 
size of several thousand combatants.35 Renamo entered Zambézia in August 
1982 (Legrand 1993, pp. 91, 92) and Nampula in April 1983 during a second 
offensive across Zambézia (Do Rosário 2009, p. 305). Both provinces experienced 
an escalation of violence in late 1986 when Renamo joined a local opposition 
force and occupied several district towns along the border to Malawi and the 
provincial border between Zambézia and Nampula. Frelimo feared that the 
rebels would take control over the north and cut the country in half along the 
Zambezi valley, the southern border of Zambézia province (Finnegan 1989, p. 
62). In late 1986 and early 1987, the Mozambican military, together with allied 
forces from Zimbabwe and Tanzania, began a counter-offensive. This operation 
returned all district towns to Frelimo control by July 1988, but did not create 
enduring stability.
Naparama’s emergence and diffusion was fuelled by Frelimo’s inability to 
protect the population from violence and displacement (Jentzsch 2014). The 
main Naparama leader in Zambézia, the traditional healer Manuel António, 
offered people an effective way to defend themselves.36 He claimed that he 
had received a divine mission from Jesus Christ to liberate the Mozambican 
people from the suffering of the war and learned of a medicine to turn bullets 
into water. He mobilised followers by ‘vaccinating’ them with this medicine.37 
The effectiveness of the medicine depended on the respect of certain rules. For 
example, Naparama combatants were
not allowed to look back, only look ahead; no one was allowed to be in front of the 
other; no fighting in the shade, always in the sun; if the enemy was in the shade, 
we were not allowed to be in the shade as well; (…) we could not retreat when 
we heard shots, we had to go there where they [Renamo] were.38
All deaths amongst the Naparamas were explained by pointing to rule 
violations.
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Learning from Renamo’s references to spiritual power, Naparama exploited 
Renamo combatants’ belief systems and formed an innovative, collective 
response to the rebel threat (Wilson 1992). By continuously advancing, often 
while singing, Naparama created such fear amongst Renamo combatants that 
it rarely came to a direct confrontation between the two forces. Renamo com-
batants fled as soon as they heard Naparamas approaching.
Although Frelimo was at first sceptical, it soon co-opted the Naparama. 
Worried by events in war-torn Angola, where two insurgent movements were 
challenging the government, Frelimo officials feared that Naparama would 
evolve into a second insurgent force.39 Moreover, the local administration was 
concerned about Naparama’s potential demands for support and compensation 
during or after the war. Before Manuel António could work in Mocuba district, for 
example, he had to ensure the local administration that his goal was not money 
or political power, but only the protection of the population.40
When local officials realised that Naparama was loyal and could contribute to 
removing the military stalemate, most of them supported Naparama’s recruit-
ment efforts and some even agreed to joint military operations. The decision to 
co-opt was thus based on pragmatic calculations to further local power inter-
ests, and not a change in the official party ideology of scientific socialism that 
despised anything ‘traditional’. Frelimo officials on the provincial and national 
level never officially acknowledged the cooperation with Naparama, although 
the party abandoned all references to Marxism-Leninism at its party congress 
in 1989 and changed its attitudes towards traditional authorities in the early 
1990s.41
This ambivalent stance towards the auxiliary forces – the need to outsource 
policing and military tasks in order to multiply forces yet the hesitation to sup-
port a ‘traditional’ force – and the ad hoc character in which Frelimo collabo-
rated with Naparama created distinct conditions in which the group was able to 
operate relatively autonomously. The group quickly diffused across districts and 
expanded its tasks from nightly patrols and food distribution to independent 
military operations. This is in stark contrast to Renamo’s strict control over the 
mujeeba and their functions within the indirect system of rule, which separated 
them from the military forces and operations.
The Naparama’s primary task was to support Frelimo local governance, which 
‘increasingly came to rely on war tactics – military control – and the use of 
community villages as counter-insurgency devices’ similar to governance in 
Renamo-held areas (Buur and Kyed 2007, p. 109). The Naparama took a prom-
inent role in the ‘recuperation’ of people from Renamo-held areas and settling 
them in Frelimo-held villages. In fact, some people joined the Naparama in 
order to bring back family members who had been captured by Renamo.42 
However, the resettlement of people often occurred coercively, and Naparama 
forces made sure that people, once in Frelimo-held areas, would not flee and 
defect to Renamo-held areas:
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We brought people [to Frelimo-held areas] and handed them over to the [local] 
government. In some cases, these people fled and returned to the bush. We had 
to go and search for them again. If the same person was recuperated more than 
four times, we had to harm her to intimidate her.43
A Naparama combatant in Mecubúri in Nampula province confirmed that 
those who did not want to return with the Naparama to Frelimo-held areas were 
killed.44 Some people stayed in Frelimo-held areas only because they feared 
being killed if they attempted to return to the areas from where they were 
displaced.45
However, in contrast to Renamo’s mujeeba, Naparama did not only serve 
Frelimo, but, as a grassroots movement, the people as well, and was therefore 
much more involved in protecting the population. For example, Naparama was 
tasked with nightly patrols to warn of imminent attacks.46 They also gathered 
information in surrounding areas, partly by collaborating with local hunters 
that were discontent with Renamo’s treatment of the population.47 Naparama 
also accompanied peasants to their fields outside the village for the collection 
of food.48
Little oversight by the provincial government and an increasingly difficult 
military situation for Frelimo facilitated the expansion of Naparama’s activities 
over time from more defensive to more offensive tasks. In the district of Alto 
Molócuè, Manuel António first worked on improving road security by treating 
bus passengers with his medicine for their own protection, and then formed 
small groups to attack Renamo strongholds in the northern part of the district 
(Pereira 1999a, p. 86). Respondents frequently reported that Naparama came to 
replace the army. A former Naparama combatant in Nampula reported that after 
a successful operation in Mecubúri, the armed forces stationed in that district 
‘decided that they would hand over their weapons to us and stop going into 
battle until the time when the war ended’.49
Overall, by tolerating Naparama’s activities, Frelimo hoped to overcome a 
military stalemate that had emerged around 1988 and substitute a weak and 
ineffective national army from which many soldiers had deserted. As a grassroots 
movement that built significantly on local belief systems, however, it did not 
only serve the government, but was also involved in protecting the population 
under Frelimo control, which made its activities less arbitrary than the mujeeba’s 
and created a form of security governance that was different from the coercive 
and oppressive one in rebel-held areas.50
Tactical Adaptation and Innovations in Security Governance
The success of the Naparama forces did not last long. Soon they were challenged 
by their opponent’s learning and ‘tactical adaptation’ (McAdam 1983, p. 736), 
the adoption of Naparama’s mobilisational technique. In addition, the main 
CIVIL WARS  337
Naparama leader, Manuel António, was killed in December 1991, which severely 
weakened the Naparama in its main area of operation, Zambézia province.
Probably towards the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991, Renamo lead-
ers in Nampula and Zambézia provinces realised that they had to respond to 
Naparama with a similar force in order to regain supremacy on the battlefield. 
They decided that collaboration with traditional healers for ritual protection 
would be the most promising response, essentially creating their own Naparama 
force. Leaders identified traditional healers capable of initiating members of 
Renamo’s existing auxiliaries – the mujeeba – to empower them to successfully 
respond to Naparama’s threat. Although Renamo’s strict control over the aux-
iliaries initially limited mujeebas’ autonomy, developments on the battlefield 
required them to expand mujeeba tasks to respond to Naparama’s threat.
One of the first anti-Naparama forces was formed in Nampula, where tradi-
tional healers in the Renamo base of Namilasse in Murrupula district treated 
youths with a vaccine to fight against Naparama and the Frelimo army.51 The 
vaccine supposedly had the same effect as Naparama’s medicine. The group, 
known under the name Mutapassa, used spears, but also had a few firearms. 
Mutapassa combatants followed similar rules as the Naparama regarding pro-
hibited food, but their main rule was that they were not allowed to shoot unless 
others did first.52
In Zambézia, another anti-Naparama force emerged in the early months of 
1991, led by the traditional healer Mulelepea (or Mulelepeya/Malelepea), which 
may even have led to the defection of some Naparama combatants (Legrand 
1993, p. 103). Renamo leaders chose between several traditional healers when 
struggling to respond to Frelimo’s counter-offensive and finally settled on one 
whose powers resembled most closely those of Naparama initiators:
Frelimo had intensified their attacks here in Nauela. This was when Renamo hired 
Mulelepea of Namixaxen. However, there was another man called Namukhotxen 
of the area of Nanthupa. Renamo asked the latter how they could solve the crit-
ical situation provoked by the enemy, and Namukhotxen answered that he was 
capable [to help] because he could transform himself into a lion and decimate the 
enemies. Renamo didn’t accept his proposal. By contrast, Mulelepea said that he 
would use magic, vaccinating the warriors so that Frelimo’s bullets didn’t penetrate 
their bodies. He was authorised to recruit men, usually youths called ‘anamavaka’ 
[spear users], to be vaccinated. They began their military operations. Renamo’s 
guerrilla fighters advanced in the second line and the ‘anamavaka’ in the first line 
of offense.53
Mulelepea was an elder of about 70 years and claimed that he had learned 
how to transform himself into a child to escape detention by the cipaios 
(Portuguese colonial police). When Mulelepea heard that there were Naparama 
in Nauela, he claimed that Manuel António’s vaccine was weak and went to 
Nauela to put his abilities into practice (Pereira 1999a, p. 95). He traveled to 
other bases in other districts and also reached the regional base Maquiringa in 
Namarrói district.54
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In contrast to Naparama’s largely voluntary mobilisation, most of the 
Mulelepea combatants were forcefully recruited from amongst the mujeeba. 
In other regards, however, Mulelepea’s forces resembled those of Naparama. The 
combatants had to follow similar rules of conduct as the Naparama.55 Moreover, 
similar to the way in which Naparama conducted joint operations with Frelimo, 
the Mulelepea combatants advanced in front of the regular Renamo units to 
make use of their special forces to clear the area.
Mulelepea’s warriors succeeded in posing a significant threat to Naparama 
and Frelimo units. The forces confronted each other for the first time in April 
1991 in Nauela, during which 25 Naparama combatants died (Pereira 1999a, 
p. 98). Mulelepea’s followers were called ‘Khonkos’, which means the strong 
and powerful (Pereira 1999a, p. 98). A former Frelimo soldier in Murrupula 
claimed that ‘Khonkos’ denotes people who are ‘crazy’ and ‘don’t like to joke 
around’.56 This demonstrates that Frelimo soldiers considered these forces as 
unpredictable, which increased their threat on the battlefield. Naparama were 
more afraid of the Khonkos than of Renamo combatants, as they claimed that 
Mulelepea’s forces were difficult to catch with bare hands and – in contrast to 
regular Renamo fighters – were able to kill Naparama with their spears (Pereira 
1999a, p. 100).
In sum, Renamo’s response to Naparama brought new momentum to the 
war in Zambézia province, after Frelimo seemed to have gained the military 
advantage. Similar to Frelimo’s initial learning process that led to its (indirect) 
support of the Naparama, Renamo was influenced by failures on the battlefield 
that gave the other side a military advantage. Tactical adaptation led to an 
expansion of mujeebas’ tasks, who began to accompany Renamo combatants on 
military operations. Although Renamo exploited local belief systems by forming 
an ‘anti-Naparama’ force, however, the strict logic of strategic delegation – rather 
than popular participation – in the formation of this new force resulted in the 
same violent and arbitrary effect on security governance as the prior mujeeba 
force.
Conclusion
The article has argued for a revision of the concept of armed group governance 
to account for the multi-actor and multi-layered nature of security governance. 
Security governance in civil war is characterised by the fragmentation of armed 
actors and delegation of responsibilities. The formation of auxiliary armed forces 
such as self-defense forces, militias and local patrols, is not only a ‘tool’ for state 
actors to outsource violence and benefit from local intelligence, but also for 
rebel groups, shaping the senior partner’s relationship with civilians. When 
resources are strained in a long and intense war, fragmentation of authority 
occurs, as armed groups in power delegate tasks to other actors.
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However, security governance may differ between rebel-held and govern-
ment-held zones. These differences have consequences for the relationship 
between those in power and the local population. As the evidence has demon-
strated, the less involved civilians are in the formation of the auxiliaries, the less 
autonomy an auxiliary has to shape its activities.
The rebel auxiliary forces in Mozambique were formed by Renamo and largely 
focused on population control and resource extraction, which supported the 
group’s focus on military objectives. In contrast, the auxiliary armed forces in 
government-held areas, which were characterised by decentralised centres of 
power, formed as a grassroots initiative and were more autonomous in expand-
ing their activities over time, in some cases even substituting for the state army. 
This had distinct consequences for relationships with civilians. Civilians in rebel-
held areas perceived the auxiliaries and the system of governance they enforced 
as exploitative and violent. In contrast, civilians in government-held areas were 
actively involved in the formation of the auxiliaries, and so the protection of the 
local population was a primary function of these new forces. This shows that 
Renamo outsourced much of the violence to auxiliaries and considered them 
to fulfil a distinct function within their system of governance. For Frelimo, the 
auxiliaries complemented their efforts, but did not replace repressive functions 
of the state (Bertelsen 2016, Macamo 2016).
However, developments on the battlefield can lead to learning and innova-
tion in security governance, and an expansion of tasks. Both the Frelimo govern-
ment and the Renamo rebels learned from each other and adapted their tactics 
when they realised that their prior tactics did not provide them with any military 
advantage. Creating, supporting or adapting auxiliary armed forces was a way to 
gain that advantage. As a consequence, security governance further militarised.
This article has made three main contributions. First, it demonstrates that 
auxiliary armed forces contribute significantly to armed group governance 
and shape the interactions between those in power and the local population. 
Second, the evidence highlights that governance in government-held areas 
evolves during wartime in important ways. Too often, studies of political order 
during wartime are focused only on rebel-held areas and do not sufficiently 
study how governance in government-held areas is affected by the war. Lastly, 
it has shown that in Mozambique, rebel and government forces used the same 
governance ‘tools’ in the form of auxiliaries, but that their implementation was 
characterised by important differences.
Future research should explore further the role of auxiliary armed forces 
in other cases in order to facilitate comparisons and conclusions about how 
widespread the formation and uses of auxiliaries are and what effect they have 
on armed group governance during civil war.
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Notes
1.  See the Introduction to this Special Issue.
2.  Fieldwork for this project was conducted in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2016 in the 
capital Maputo, the provincial capitals Nampula and Quelimane, Mecubúri and 
Murrupula districts in Nampula province and Lugela, Namarrói, and Nicoadala 
districts in Zambézia.
3.  The term comes from McAdam’s analysis of tactical innovation and adaptation 
during the civil rights struggle in the USA in the 1950s and 1960s. The formation 
of auxiliary armed forces could be understood as a tactical adaptation in civil war 
that responds to tactical innovations on the opponent’s side. See McAdam (1983).
4.  For an overview of the differences of wartime developments across regions, see 
the introduction in Englund (2002) and Cahen et al. (forthcoming). For a history 
of the war, see Robinson (2006) and Emerson (2014).
5.  For a critical re-evaluation of Renamo violence, see Schafer (2007). On the role 
of violence in Frelimo state formation and during war, see Macamo (2016) and 
Bertelsen (2016).
6.  Interview with male resident (2011-11-28-m22, Murrupula-Chinga, Nampula). 
In order to protect the identities of the respondents, the interview citations 
indicate date, location, the interviewee’s role during the war, and gender of the 
interviewees: N (Naparama); F (Frelimo combatant); R (Renamo combatant); M 
(militiaman); P (religious leader); L (local leader including traditional and other 
community leaders); H (traditional healer); G (government representative); m 
(male); f (female). Frelimo had abandoned the system of traditional authorities 
immediately after independence, accusing traditional leaders of having 
collaborated with the colonial state. Frelimo sought to abandon what it called 
‘obscurantism’ in society – all types of religion including traditional religion and 
traditional healing. Alexander (1997) shows though that traditional authorities 
continued to influence local politics after independence.
7.  There is an intense debate over the origins of the war in Mozambique and the 
extent of popular support for Renamo. While scholars largely agree that without 
external aggression from Rhodesia and South Africa, the war might not have 
happened, domestic discontent and local conflicts increased support for Renamo 
and fuelled the war. See, for example, Roesch (1989), Minter (1994), Cahen (2000), 
Lubkemann (2008, Chapter 3) and Jentzsch (2014).
8.  4334 Renamo soldiers (19.7 per cent of total ex-Renamo fighters) and 3073 
government soldiers were aged between 10 and 14 at the time of their abduction 
and can be considered child soldiers (Barnes 1997, p. 17).
9.  Former Renamo combatants made frequent references to radios in bases and 
advance posts in interviews with me.
10.  The structure below the regional commanders is not as clear as the higher 
command and there might have been regional variations (Vines 1991, p. 81).
11.  Interview with former Renamo combatants (2012-03-08-Rm14, Nicoadala, 
Zambézia; 2011-10-15-Rm2, Mecubúri, Nampula).
12.  Interview with former Renamo combatant (2011-10-23-Rm3, Mecubúri, Nampula).
13.  Interview with male resident (2011-11-28-m22, Murrupula, Nampula).
14.  Geffray (1990, p. 120 fn. 3) notes that the term mambo probably originated in 
the Ndau region in central Mozambique, where most of Renamo’s officers come 
from. The origin of the term ‘mujeeba’ seems to come from the Zimbabwean 
liberation struggle. Renamo learned the role and function of mujeebas from 
the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (ZANLA), as the Rhodesians trained 
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early Renamo members in ZANLA methods and techniques (Wilson 1992, p. 541). 
While the mujeeba were most prominent in the central region, across the border 
from Zimbabwe and the heartland of Renamo activity, evidence from secondary 
sources and my own interviews demonstrate the crucial role of mujeebas in 
Zambézia and Nampula as well.
15.  Interview with former mambo (2011-10-23-m7, Mecubúri, Nampula).
16.  I have not seen this term used in other research on the war and my own sources 
have also not referred to such a category of local officials. This is probably due 
to regional variations in systems of Renamo governance.
17.  Interview with former Renamo civilian administrator (2012-06-22-Rm20, Regone, 
Zambézia).
18.  Interview with former Frelimo combatant (2011-09-13-Fm1, Nicoadala, Zambézia).
19.  Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-09-09-Nm4, Nicoadala, 
Zambézia).
20.  Interview with former Renamo combatant (2012-03-08-Rm14, Nicoadala, 
Zambézia). Vines (1991, pp. 92, 93) notes that this version of a base is a regional 
variation of Renamo’s bases in the north. In southern regions, where bases were 
more mobile, combatants lived farther away from the population.
21.  Interviews with former Renamo combatant (2011-10-23-Rm3, Mecubúri, 
Nampula) and former Renamo civilian administrator (2012-06-22-Rm20, Regone, 
Zambézia).
22.  Interview with former Renamo combatant (2011-08-18-Rm1, Maputo, Zambézia).
23.  Interview with former Renamo combatant (2011-10-23-Rm3, Mecubúri, Nampula).
24.  Interviews with a woman and a man who lived in Renamo-controlled areas 
(2011-11-25-f11, Murrupula-Nampaua; 2011-11-24-m18, Murrupula-Namilasse, 
Nampula).
25.  Interview with Renamo Secretary General Fernandes in 1985, quoted in Hall 
(1990, p. 50).
26.  Interview with former Renamo civilian administrator (2012-06-22-Rm20, Regone, 
Zambézia).
27.  Also see Pereira (1999a, p. 46). This was again similar to ZANLA’s mujeeba, who 
often punished people for not respecting and listening to the guerrillas (Maxwell 
1993, p. 374).
28.  Some scholars assert that mujeebas were recruited amongst former cipaios 
(‘native police during the colonial era’), which would have provided them with 
experience in policing and intelligence (Hall 1990, p. 56).
29.  Interview with a group of community leaders who lived under Renamo control 
(2012-06-14-Gr-Lm4, Lugela-Tacuane, Zambézia).
30.  Interview with community leader (2011-10-17-Lm11, Mecuburi, Nampula).
31.  Interview with community leader (2011-10-17-Lm11, Mecuburi, Nampula); 
Interview with local government official (2011-11-10-Gm13, Nampula); Interview 
with former Naparama combatant (2011-11-04-Nm37, Murrupula, Nampula); 
Interview with male resident (2011-11-06-m11, Murrupula, Nampula). Also see 
Hall and Young (1997).
32.  Interview with community leader (2011-09-23-Lm3a, Nicoadala, Zambézia).
33.  Frelimo’s suspicion reflected a more general sentiment that the mujeeba were 
easily corrupted and often worked for both sides of the conflict. Interview with 
community leader (2011-09-21-Lm1, Nicoadala, Zambézia).
34.  After independence, Frelimo mobilised civilians into ‘popular militias’. Once 
Renamo became a severe threat in the early 1980s, militias were tasked with 
vigilance. These militias, lacking in supplies and morale, did not manage to build 
342   C. JENTZSCH
a successful defense against Renamo attacks in Zambézia and Nampula and so 
community residents developed their own forms of protection. See Jentzsch 
(2014).
35.  The number of Naparama combatants is difficult to ascertain. Its main leader in 
Zambézia, Manuel António, claimed to have about 14,000 fighters in May 1991 
(Waterhouse 1991, p. 14). However, the journalist Gil Lauriciano, who covered the 
war in Zambézia extensively, estimates that the group did not have more than 
2000 members (personal communication, July 2010). Based on my interviews 
with former Naparama members that indicate that many districts had about 
200 Naparama, which only included those in the main district town, I estimate 
the size to about 4000–6000 members across both provinces, Zambézia and 
Nampula. The current Naparama leadership claims to have registered 4438 former 
Naparama in four districts, which are Inhassunge, Nicoadala, Namacurra and 
Mopeia (Interview 2011-08-23-Gr-Nm1, Quelimane, Zambézia). As a comparison, 
Renamo was estimated to have about 20,000 combatants.
36.  Interviews with former Naparama combatants (2011-09-19-Nm11, Nicoadala, 
Zambézia; 2011-09-20-Fm2-N, Nicoadala, Zambézia). For a detailed history of 
the Naparama and its leadership, see Jentzsch (2014).
37.  Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-09-09-Nm2, Nicoadala, 
Zambézia).
38.  Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-09-09-Nm2, Nicoadala, 
Zambézia).
39.  Interview with provincial government representative (2011-10-10-Gm7, 
Nampula).
40.  Interview with former Naparama leader (2012-06-06-Nm46, Lugela, Zambézia).
41.  Due to this strict denial of Frelimo-Naparama cooperation on the national 
level, Naparama was not considered a party to the conflict during the peace 
negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo and was therefore not included in 
post-war demobilisation programs (Coelho and Vines 1992).
42.  Six respondents in Nicoadala, Zambézia, said they joined to bring back family 
members and friends. E.g., Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-
09-09-Nm4, Nicoadala, Zambézia).
43.  Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-09-14-Nm10, Nicoadala, 
Zambézia).
44.  Interview with Naparama combatant (2011-10-16-Nm25, Mecubúri, Nampula).
45.  Interview with female resident (2011-11-25-f10, Murrupula-Nampaua, Nampula).
46.  Interview with local leader (2011-09-23-Lm3a, Nicoadala, Zambézia); Interview 
with female resident (2011-09-26-Lf1, Nicoadala, Zambézia); Interview with 
Naparama commander (2012-06-10-Nm46, Lugela, Zambézia); Interview with 
male resident (2011-10-02-m5, Nicoadala, Zambézia).
47.  Interview with Naparama combatant (2011-09-14-Nm10, Nicoadala, Zambézia).
48.  Interview with Naparama commander (2012-06-10-Nm46, Lugela, Zambézia).
49.  Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-10-22-Nm27, Mecubúri, 
Nampula).
50.  There is some regional and temporal variation in Naparama’s perpetration of 
violence, which I cannot discuss here due to space constraints, but as Naparama 
became more successful over time, it seemed to also become more violent 
against civilians, especially in Renamo-held areas. See Jentzsch (2014).
51.  Interview with male resident (2011-11-24-m18, Namilasse, Murrupula, Nampula). 
Other interviewees identified the traditional healer as Sabala from Taveia in 
Ribáuè district in Nampula who had treated youths in Ribáuè-Sede. See Interviews 
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with male resident (2011-11-28-m22, Chinga, Murrupula, Nampula) and former 
Frelimo combatant (2011-11-28-Fm13, Nampaua, Murrupula, Nampula).
52.  Interviews with male residents (2011-11-24-m18; 2011-11-24-m19, Namilasse, 
Murrupula, Nampula).
53.  Interviewee cited in Pereira (1999a, p. 94). Translation from Portuguese by the 
author.
54.  Interview with former Renamo combatants (2012-06-22-Gr-Rm3, Rumala, 
Namarrói, Zambézia).
55.  Interview with former Renamo combatants (2012-06-22-Gr-Rm3, Rumala, 
Namarrói, Zambézia).
56.  Interview with former Frelimo combatant (2011-11-28-Fm13, Nampaua, 
Murrupula, Nampula).
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